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Abstract 
This article offers theoretical and practical reflections on the operations involved 
in description and interpretation based on ‘close looking’. Explanations are given 
of the necessary appeal to contexts of origin or reception in order to disambiguate 
works of art, the widespread though rarely acknowledged reliance on an 
attenuated form of intention, and the way in practice that contexts are mobilised 
in the description or ‘redescription’ of works of art. Wider points made concern 
scepticism about the idea that works of art might determine their own 
interpretation (including problems with claims made as part of the 
phenomenological turn in image studies for the priority of direct or unmediated 
response to works of art), the quasi-allegorical nature of even ostensibly object-
centred interpretation, and consequences of the fact that modernism can function 
as a kind of context. 
 
 
 
It is often said in relation to works of art that ‘close looking’ – or close attention to 
‘the object’ – should have a privileged status. In the words of a recent Art Bulletin 
contributor: ‘I never feel more like an art historian than when, after a student has 
done her share of exhaustive research, has tried to interpret an artwork in light of 
all the readings I have assigned, I ask her to set that aside. “Just look,” I say. I ask 
her to base her observations on the way the artwork resists the context we can 
mobilize around it. Given what we know, what is different here from what we 
might expect?’1 
This sort of thinking has had perhaps its most focused exploration in writing 
on modernism, where from Roger Fry through to Rosalind Krauss a critical 
tradition committed to close inspection of its objects, often called formalist or neo-
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formalist, has attempted to propose a method that minimises or cuts out entirely 
the appeal to external, contextual, or associative factors. According to one 
supporter of this tradition, Charles Harrison, the best justification for close 
attention to artworks is that certain works of art resulting from ‘exceptional and 
intentional care’ ‘have a greater capacity than others to arbitrate what is and is not 
a valid description’.2 As such ‘it is this capacity in the work to arbitrate its own 
description that the artist deserving of the name tests for in the self-critical 
procedures of the practice’.3 ‘Harrison’, a sympathetic commentator notes, ‘claims 
that there is one point forcefully made by the writers of modernist criticism that 
deserves reiteration. That is that works of art are not necessarily interpretable by 
reference to social or historical events; they are events requiring interpretation in 
their own right’.4 
In this essay I offer theoretical and practical reflections on the operations 
involved in description and interpretation based on close looking, a corollary of 
the account being scepticism about taking claims like Harrison’s too literally. By 
‘claims like’, as should become especially clear through the first and second 
sections, I include those made as part of the phenomenological turn in image 
studies for the priority of direct or unmediated response to works of art.5 Sections 
on ‘Context and Disambiguation’, ‘The Appeal to Intention’, and ‘Description and 
Redescription’, explore three main points. First, however close the inspection of a 
work of art, a context of origin or reception must be used in order to disambiguate 
it. Second, the typical and most secure form of disambiguation is not just an appeal 
to context of origin, but more narrowly to an attenuated form of intention. Third, 
description based on ‘close looking’ tends to operate via ‘redescription’ of picked 
out qualities according to a particular context or set of contexts (and in the case of 
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much modernist criticism, that rather than a rejection of context, the writer’s view 
of modernism itself functions as such a context). Finally I close with brief 
reflections on the way that a governing context, such as modernism, is used to 
attribute a generalised form of personhood to those artists to which it is applied. 
In relation to writing on modernism, one notion that emerges is this: that 
this kind of writing might be understood as projecting onto a set of artists a 
universalized underlying intention to ‘be modernist’, then relativizing the 
interpretation of their works to a stylistic and ideological context based on the 
relevant stage in the particular writer’s take on modernism and its unfolding. 
(This is not to deny that many writers on modernism are fully aware that 
‘minimising context’ in the name of close looking really means a shift of the 
contextual burden on to their views of modernism and its art history; it is, though, 
to say that the subtleties of that position have often been lost on readers, 
explicators, and followers.)  
More generally, interpretations based on ‘just looking’ (or on ‘form’, or 
‘structure’, or the ‘signifier’), emerge in practice as yielding not exactly a closer 
relation to the ‘object’, but a kind of allegory structured by whatever context is, 
however implicitly, being brought to bear. ‘Modernist criticism’ would then be one 
special form of this allegorisation, albeit an especially successful, influential, and 
according to some accounts defensible, one. 
 
Context and Disambiguation 
It is a familiar notion that pictures are deeply ambiguous. Art-historical examples 
range from simple decisions about representational matters much debated in the 
literature – is the item closest to us on the table in Parmigianino’s Portrait of a 
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Collector (in the National Gallery, London) a rat or an antique statue; are there 
faces hidden in Dürer’s sketches of pillows (plate 1)? – to those ‘monstrously 
ambiguous’ works such as Giorgione’s Tempesta or Velasquez’s Las Meninas, 
where ever-proliferating scholarship leads to ever-less hope of agreement about 
what exactly is going on.6  
The issue can be presented in a radicalised manner through the idea of 
indiscernibles – of initially perceptually identical objects that when linked to 
different contexts yield dramatically different sets of properties. Take the short 
story by Jorge Luis Borges in which, in the early twentieth century, the character 
Pierre Menard produces a ‘new’ version of Don Quixote that is in fact identical 
word for word.7 In his text Borges is able to quote identical passages from the 
‘two’ works and enumerate the striking differences between the earlier and later: 
the ‘crude’ becomes ‘subtle’; the ‘natural’ becomes ‘archaic’ and ‘affected’; the 
‘merely rhetorical’ becomes ‘brazenly pragmatic’.8 At one point it is said that ‘The 
Cervantes text and the Menard text are verbally identical, but the second is almost 
infinitely richer’.9 Inspired in part by this example, Arthur Danto’s imaginary 
exhibition of seven identical looking painted and framed red rectangles has 
presented the pictorial equivalent most succinctly. Knowing that one of these is a 
painting of ‘Israelites Crossing the Red Sea’, that one is of ‘Kierkegaard’s Mood’, 
one is a canvas primed by Giorgione on which a sacra conversazione was planned, 
and so on, leads to the realisation by the viewer that each of these initially 
indiscernible red squares has entirely different sets of properties, representing 
and expressing different things, or being something we may not acknowledge as a 
work of art at all.10 
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Leaving aside Danto’s grander claims about the ontology of art, one lesson 
that has been drawn from this thought experiment is that fixing what a particular 
work of art is taken to be is a highly context-specific matter – a case of a text or 
sound structure or physical object being indicated in a particular context.11 
Determination of the features of a work of art, including what it represents, 
expresses, means, and so forth, typically depends on an idea about the origin of 
that work.12 This determining origin can be roughly described as a ‘context of 
origin’, indicating a need for the information that the work was made by a 
particular person (or persons) at a particular time in a particular artistic context. 
More controversially, though undoubtedly often the case in practice, 
determination of the work can also depend on a ‘context of reception’, such as the 
particular gaze directed towards it or perspective from which it is looked at.13 
Either way, use of such a context is the only way that ambiguity can be resolved. 
And because indiscernibles show that the features through which the work is 
disambiguated do not have to be immediately visually apparent, this means that 
works can in theory always be redescribed if a new construction of context of 
origin or reception is brought to bear.14  
This adds up to what we know is the case from experience – that the works 
best able to arbitrate their own description are simply the ones about which we 
have the firmest agreement on the kinds of intention and context that fix their 
identity. The Tempesta has often been held up as a prime example of an inherently 
ambiguous paining.15 But a key reason that it is so ambiguous is that we have so 
have little information about the place and time and context of the painting’s 
creation, including Giorgione’s intentions, those of the patrons, and those of 
contemporary scholarly or lay audiences. Later but eminently non-modernist 
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paintings like Luke Fildes’ much-abused The Doctor are in fact far better able to 
arbitrate their own description (plate 2). But rather than a question of ‘exceptional 
and intentional care’ (Harrison), or the quality of pictorial thought, the reason that 
such a work does not yield deep ambiguity is that we are pretty sure that we know 
how Fildes and most significant contemporary audiences would have seen the 
work. Some of the most revered modernist works now edge close to the category 
of what James Elkins calls ‘monstrous ambiguity’, whereby the literature on them 
is so large that a whole term of a university course devoted to just one such work 
would be insufficient to cover it.16 The Doctor, on the other hand, is so ‘stable’ as a 
work that in art-critical and -historical articles it is only mentioned as an easy 
example rather than analysed as a problem, as if everything about it is eminently 
plain to see. It is more likely to be dealt with at length in medical journals than art-
historical ones, and there talked about as an emblem for the profession, or as 
evidence for historical medical practices.17 
At this point it may be obvious to art historians familiar with critiques of 
‘context’ that disambiguation via context of origin or reception means there are 
both horizontal and vertical paths to potentially unmanageable indeterminacy.18 
In the first case the kind of information that may be included in the construction of 
‘originating context’ has no easily definable limit to its outward extension.19 And 
in the second, the many conceivable reception-situations from the creation of the 
work right down to the present day mean a similarly open-ended proliferation of 
potentially determining ‘contexts’.  
As is understandable for an activity that claims to say historical things about 
its objects, art history has traditionally appealed to a version of originating 
context in order to establish the ‘historically accurate’ disambiguation of the work, 
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and this in practice tends to reduce to a construction of the way that the original 
makers or users of the work would have seen or used the work. Many are happy to 
use ‘intention’ as a shorthand for this. But intention, as will be addressed further 
below, is an even more controversial term in art history than context. Whether 
acknowledging an embrace of intention or not, art historians have thus carefully 
worked up a set of vocabularies or rhetorical moves that allow them to 
circumvent this problem, in what I call the appeal to an attenuated form of 
intention. Something very like originating context or intentionality is regularly 
appealed to in order to disambiguate the work, but in a way that does not commit 
the writer to a belief in recoverable or conscious mental states determining the 
meaning of the work; talk of ‘intention’ is replaced by that of the posited 
‘purposefulness’ that has constituted the ‘forward-leaning look’ of the object, by 
‘networks of forms of likeness’ for the maker, or ‘forms of likeness that things 
have in a particular form of life’, by the vision, gaze, or not necessarily conscious 
experience of the maker, or even simply implied by the language of conscious 
artistic agency through which the interpretation is narrated.20 
The unavoidability of some minimal notion of intention at this grounding 
level is demonstrated as clearly as anywhere in James Elkins’ book on ‘the origins 
of modern pictorial complexity’, from which my opening examples were drawn. 
Elkins does not discuss or appeal directly to intention in deciding the cases of 
ambiguity, but in every instance the decision about what the picture is ‘of’ reduces 
to how its maker would have seen it, so that distinctions are drawn between 
(proper intentionally-grounded) ‘seeing in’ and (merely viewer-generated) 
‘reading in’, with the latter described as ‘projecting’ or ‘hallucinating’.21 To put the 
point another way: how many art history books, however radical in rhetoric, have 
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ever treated their subject matter as a series of origin-less found objects, and thus 
discussed works of art without any reference to the usually attributed creator and 
date of creation?22 
 
The Appeal to Intention 
An important aspect of the claim that there is typically an appeal to an attenuated 
form of intention to establish the identity of the work – to purposefulness, or 
vision, or the gaze, or not-fully-conscious intentionality – is brought into focus by 
the case of modernist criticism. For while some, such as Harrison and Michael 
Fried, have stressed the importance of artistic intention, they have at the same 
time maintained that close inspection of the works in question is the privileged 
route to its discovery.23 And notoriously, other prominent writers on modernist 
art – including Clement Greenberg and Roger Fry – have allied their commitment 
to close looking with a more direct insistence that intention, at least at the 
conscious level found in artists’ own statements about their work, is irrelevant to 
a proper understanding of the art in question.24 ‘Formalists’, as W. J. T. Mitchell 
has put it, ‘think that meaning will take care of itself if we “subtract” extrinsic 
intention and let the language of the text work on us.’25 
Nonetheless, as Mitchell’s reference to ‘extrinsic’ intention implies, strategies 
like the formalist one that privilege the experience had in the face of the work 
leave open the possibility that meaning found in this way can be classed as a truer 
kind of (‘intrinsic’) intention. Amongst other places, the point is put especially 
directly in Stanley Cavell’s insistence that the work alone should tell a properly 
capable observer everything they need about intention, and so that ‘if we have 
earned the right to question it [about intention], the object will answer; otherwise 
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not’.26 Whether the writer is Fry or Fried, then, this allows for an appeal to 
intention in order to establish the proper identity of the work, but with such 
intention found primarily ‘in’ the work through the critic’s own ‘close’ inspection. 
The ‘best possible’ interpretation of the work is taken over and above the 
conscious statements of the artist, and is then narrated in a manner – with the 
artist activated by being made the subject of the sentence or clause – that presents 
the thought as well as the action described by the critic as the artist’s own.27 Even 
where the relevance of intention is explicitly denied, the critic can nonetheless 
present the meaning they have discovered ‘in’ the work in strong terms of 
individual artistic agency. 
The tactic is exemplified in Rosalind Krauss’s essay ‘The Latin Class’, on Cy 
Twombly.28 There we read Krauss’s arguments about Twombly’s practice 
repeatedly narrated as if they indicate Twombly’s intent, or in Krauss’s words are 
‘crucial to getting Twombly’s tone’.29 It is claimed, for example, that ‘he drew his 
own conclusions about the import of Abstract Expressionist gesture’; that 
‘Twombly took up graffiti as a way of interpreting the meaning of action painting’s 
mark’; that the connection with Jackson Pollock’s work is ‘a way of declaring how 
Pollock’s work should be read, at least in Twombly’s eyes’; that ‘he cannot write 
“Virgil” on a painting and mean it straight’; and even of an interpretation contrary 
to Krauss’s own that ‘It is this reading Twombly seems to protest with every 
means at his disposal’.30 Then, revealing that Twombly’s own written and spoken 
words seem to contradict her interpretation, Krauss turns to an apparently anti-
intentionalist stance:  
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Do we care? To what degree do we have to respect Twombly’s self-
assessment […] To what degree is it our responsibility to make an 
independent reading of an artist’s work, acknowledging that while an artist 
may be a good interpreter of his or her own production, it does not follow 
that he or she will be its best one? No more than the analysand is the best 
reader of his or her dreams, motives, associations. To the contrary: The 
analysand is often the worst.31 
 
What this hints at, while needing further elaboration, is the way that those 
advocates of modernist painting who are most apparently ‘for’ or ‘against’ 
intention, when arguing for the rightness of their own interpretation, in practice 
end up working according to the same basic principle. That is, the principle of the 
appeal to an attenuated form of intention – discovered primarily through close 
visual inspection – in order to disambiguate the work. 
 
A way into the issue is offered by recent debates over intention and affect in 
the work of Henri Matisse, in particular as staged in a 2013 book by Todd Cronan, 
Against Affective Formalism.32 There Cronan takes aim at those he describes as 
‘affective formalists’ among recent writers on Matisse, in particular: Gilles 
Deleuze; Yve-Alain Bois; Rosalind Krauss; J. M. Bernstein; Alastair Wright; Éric 
Alliez; and Jean-Claude Bonne. This mode of writing, for Cronan, is characterised 
throughout by the view that the artist developed a ‘surefire “system” to produce 
violent sensations in the beholder’s body’, his works being ‘affective “machines”’ 
that directly transfer expressive content through their formal structure, thus 
obviating any kind of representational mediation.33 Instead, Cronan argues that: 
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Matisse’s work suggests something other than fantasies of expressive 
communion or affective transfer. Contrary to what Matisse sometimes said 
about the transparency of expression or the immediacy of affect […] his 
works reflect on the problems of representing oneself to another, of how it is 
that a set of marks on a canvas or a sheet of paper can be understood or 
misunderstood, felt or rejected, by a beholder or even by oneself. Matisse 
came to feel that any work that did not open itself up to the possibility of 
failing to mean to another was a work that failed to mean at all […] It is the 
discovery of the limits of and potentials for representation that is the 
primary content of his oeuvre’.34 
 
Despite Matisse’s nods to affect, Cronan concludes, his work ‘is better seen as a 
profound reflection on the limits and powers of expression as a mode of 
understanding’. His work reveals ‘that to express oneself to another requires an 
acknowledgement of the other’s difference; this difference both threatens 
isolation and makes every connection like an unrepeatable gift.’ To refuse this gift 
or to take it for granted – in the latter case to seek direct transmission of affects – 
‘would involve a denial of the other and of oneself’.35 
Foundational in the thought about Matisse that Cronan criticises, as he at 
one point notes, is the writing of Yve-Alain Bois. In the work that forms the crux of 
Bois’s reading of Matisse’s painting as ‘blinding’, he focuses in particular on the 
years between 1906 and 1911 during which Matisse ‘conclusively put in place’ his 
‘system’, and in doing so definitively rejected the traditional conceptions of the 
decorative favoured by certain non-progressive contemporaries.36 As his patron’s 
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support waned in the face of Matisse’s radicalism, Bois writes, Matisse ‘took a 
huge gamble’, and ‘as if he had nothing to lose’, carried ‘to the extreme’ the 
‘decorative profusion that had characterized many of his works from the previous 
years’.37 Bois writes as follows of the two canvases that resulted: 
 
Both Seville Still Life [c.1910-11, now in the State Hermitage Museum, St 
Petersburg] and Spanish Still Life [plate 3] are difficult to behold – that is, the 
viewer cannot gaze at their pullulating arabesques and color flashes for very 
long. As had already happened in Le Bonheur de vivre, but now much more 
so, these paintings appear to spin before the eye; nothing there ever seems 
to come to rest. Flowers, fruits, and pots pop up like bubbles that dissolve 
into their busy, swirling background as quickly as one manages to isolate 
them. The centrality of the figure is dismantled: the viewer feels compelled 
to look at everything at once, at the whole visual field, but at the same time 
feels forced to rely on peripheral vision to do so, at the expense of control 
over that very field.38 
 
Following on from the earlier development of ‘Matisse’s system’, this is what Bois 
calls Matisse’s ‘aesthetic of blinding’.39 It operates just as much, Bois writes, in an 
apparently simpler and calmer canvas such as Matisse’s Music of 1910 (now in the 
State Hermitage Museum, St Petersburg), for there the sheer size of the picture – 
‘one hundred-plus feet of saturated colour’ – combines with the even distribution 
of figures to create an ‘aporia of perception’.40 The pull of the background colour 
leaves one unable to contemplate a single musician, while converse attention to 
the picture as a whole is disrupted by the ‘optical vibrations’ of the vermillion 
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forms against the blue-and-green ground. Bois bases his analyses on the notion 
that figure and ground are ‘the very opposition on which human vision is based’, 
and that the way they annul each other in Matisse’s work – are ‘deliberately 
destabilized’ – means that ‘our vision ends up blurred, blinded by excess’.41 This 
figure/ground aspect is not just blinding, but also hypnotising, ‘based on a 
pendulum in our perception that makes us switch from our incapacity to focus on 
the figures to that of seizing the whole visual field at once, an oscillation that 
defines the very invention of Matisse’s concept of the “decorative”’.42 To give just 
one more of Bois’s analyses:  
 
in Interior with Eggplants [plate 4] […] everything cooperates in leading us 
astray: the pulsating repetition of the flower motif that invades floor and 
walls and blurs their demarcation; the reflection in the mirror that 
coloristically matches the landscape outside the window and confuses levels 
of reality; the syncopated rhythm and different scales of the ornamental 
fabrics; the gestures of the two sculptures (one on the table, the other on the 
mantelpiece) that rhyme with the arabesques of the folding screen. The 
three eggplants that give the painting its title are right in the middle of the 
canvas, but Matisse has blinded us to them and it is only through a conscious 
effort that we manage, only fleetingly, to locate them.43 
 
So what is so wrong with this kind of writing? Cronan is committed to a view of 
intentionality roughly derived from that of Walter Benn Michaels and Stephen 
Knapp’s 1982 paper ‘Against Theory’, and re-presented a number of times over 
the years.44 According to this view, in order for us to interpret their meaning, 
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works of art must be recognised as products of intention (which once discovered 
simply is their meaning). Refusing intention forces one to treat works as if they 
were objects like any other in the world rather than works of art made by a 
person or persons in a time and place, and leaves one able to appeal only to the 
subjective experience of the empirical viewer, which given its inherently personal 
nature is not something about which we can debate. At a number of points in his 
book Cronan makes clear that he equates the appeal to ‘affect’ with exactly this 
kind of experience of the empirical viewer.45 It is something that is within 
someone and simply a ‘fact’, that no one can reasonably confirm or deny – no one 
can tell you that you have failed to experience yourself correctly – and thus 
something no one can argue about. This investment of the picture-as-object alone 
with agency naturally obviates what the artist themselves did, thought, and felt, 
and has as a result, for Cronan, nothing at all to do with art and its interpretation. 
Where Knapp and Michaels were reticent, Cronan offers a detailed and 
highly sophisticated view of intention, pointing out that those who refuse it tend 
to base their critique on an impossibly simplistic construct of what intent might 
involve.46 Perhaps most significantly, given the standard complaints about 
intention, Cronan claims his account to be ‘antipsychological’ in a sense, for it is 
‘not an appeal to artistic psychology, to figuring out what is going on inside an 
artist’s head or heart’.47 Intention thus has nothing to do with a conscious mental 
plan in the mind that precedes the work – probably the most prevalent 
misrepresentation – nor is to be equated with the artist’s conscious or articulated 
sense of the work’s meaning.48 Instead it is a mixture of conscious and 
unconscious aspects, formed in and during the creation of the work. Intentions 
emerge ‘in and through the process of production’, and largely come to be known 
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once they have been ‘externalized for a beholder’ (which can include the artist as 
beholder of their own picture). This beholder can in turn ‘come to know him- or 
herself in the encounter with the work’.49 
Analysis carried out on this basis is not a case of ‘finally or ultimately 
knowing’, of attaining a moment where ‘the intention is fully captured or 
recovered by the interpreter’.50 It is instead simply ‘to say that an artist meant 
something by his or her work, and that is what the art historian aims to 
understand by whatever means available’ – recovery of past meanings is ‘an 
ongoing challenge’ that ‘should not be forfeited on the grounds that one cannot 
have absolute certainty’. Its methodology is mixed, involving cautious usage of 
‘writings, statements, interviews, documents’, and ‘biography’. But the ‘primary 
evidence’ in the readings of Matisse ‘are the visual characteristics of his work. And 
the characteristics that are relevant to my account are the ones I see as intended 
by the artist’.51 
There are echoes of both Stanley Cavell and Richard Wollheim here, in the 
sense that intention is something that you can ultimately come to know through 
close inspection of the work itself, even in the most unlikely of cases. In 
Wollheim’s account, close in many respects to Cronan’s, the artist paints not just 
with the eyes, but for the eyes, at times acting as spectator of their own work, and 
imagining how a viewer of their work would respond.52 The effects of a work, in 
other words, are ones that the artist can be imagined to have experienced or 
intended themselves, as spectator of the work up until the moment it is done with. 
Thus Wollheim’s famous multiple hour sessions of close inspection of single works 
would yield up apparently highly unlikely results which could be safely taken as 
definitely intended properties of the work, dispensing with any caution about 
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visual ambiguity or overdetermination in the viewer’s experience.53 Take his 
account of the realisation that Manet’s paintings contained an internal spectator, 
where at the 1984 Manet exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art ‘time and 
time again, I discovered that I was engaging in imaginative enactments of a kind 
that might be expected to follow in the wake of my explicitly locating an internal 
spectator. Yet I had done no such thing. That being so, I trusted my eyes had not 
deceived me, and that the repertoire that I was following with such conviction was 
one for which my perception of the painting had given me some warrant: some 
implicit warrant, that is.’54 
This take on intention places the texts of Bois and others like him in a very 
different light. Recall their quasi-objective claims about the perceptual effects that 
Matisse’s works have. If these were nothing more than ‘affect’ in Cronan’s terms, 
they would not be universalizable, but instead would have to be described as 
differing for each individual viewer. Think also that what Bois describes (or at 
least Cronan represents him describing) as ‘affects’, simply could not be the result 
of a context-less object working on the nervous system of the viewer: the way that 
the ‘thing’ doing the affecting is described by these writers – by detailed reference 
to Matisse’s biography and writings, and as the product of ‘Matisse thought’, or the 
‘Matisse system’ – makes it painfully clear that it has already been preconstituted 
as ‘a Matisse’. The object is securely disambiguated by the knowledge of its origins 
as a particular ‘work’ of art made by a particular artist in a cultural context, rather 
than just a found and context-less layer of oil and pigment. 
What is happening here is that the effects are being described as the 
inevitable ones of looking at a Matisse, when seen as the particular cultural object 
that it is, created in a particular artistic context by a particular maker who would 
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have seen it in a particular way. (Against the idea that affects are universal and 
inescapable, Bois and Wright note with evident disapproval that many have seen 
and still do see these works in ways that do not accord with their own readings, 
while Alliez and Bonn conclude that the logic of affect leaves viewers open to revel 
in their own responses, however personal.)55 The writers reject conscious and 
naïve constructs of intention. And in doing so they fall back on a mid way 
construct which they may or may not call ‘intention’ in theory, but which in 
practice leads them to work in a way that is importantly close to that of Cronan.56 
Bois’s idea that the perceptual effects described are so fundamental is gained from 
a combination of biographical and written evidence from Matisse himself, and the 
overriding sense in front of the work that these are the right experiences to 
have.57 Implicit in that judgement, of course, is that those are the experiences 
Matisse would have had of the work. As Bois says elsewhere, ‘Matisse’s goal was 
not to represent the thing, but to represent the effect of the thing on him when he 
was painting it, and to create the same effect on the beholder’.58 
Some call it intentionality and others anti-intentionality, then. But the tactic 
of depsychologized intention-as-hypothetical-construct, where a cautious 
approach is taken to biography and conscious statements, and the effects of the 
work are given priority, is in fact a shared feature of the writing of Cronan and 
Bois. Their disagreement – and whatever Cronan says about not being able to 
argue with Bois, he certainly does – is about the particular effects that the work 
has, the underlying intentions in the work that these reflect, and the way that 
meaning should be constructed out of them. Disagreement, in other words, about 
how the work should be disambiguated –properly seen and experienced –based 
on how its originating context is understood.  
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Description and Redescription 
So much for intention.59 But what of the more general ideas of ‘context’ – whether 
original art-historical or cultural context, or later contexts of reception – of which 
intention is only really one component? I said earlier that one lesson of 
indiscernibles was that no matter what the immediately visible look of the work, 
the bringing to bear of a new context would always allow the work to be 
redescribed. If the features are not directly visible, the language of art writing is 
well equipped to redescribe them in a metaphorical or analogical way, a process 
that has been explained by various writers as one that is carried out by adopting a 
mode of (metaphorical) seeing-as (rather than seeing-in), by attention to non-
visible likenesses (rather than visible ones), or by the application of artistic 
perception (as opposed to pictorial perception).60 What I want to show in this 
section is not what underlies ‘redescription’, however, but rather how this works in 
practice: the way that the introduction of a context can then allow the art writer to 
redescribe properties of the work in the service of a general description or 
interpretation, perhaps especially when that description is based on ‘close 
looking’.61  
An important side note to this is how such broadened contexts are 
subsequently recouped at the level of attenuated intention, as if the artist 
themselves would in some way have seen or experienced or ‘meant’ the work in 
the way that the redescription discovers. This is something like a rhetorical 
concertina effect, as the writing expands outwards to propose an increasingly 
inclusive set of contexts relative to which the work is to be described, then 
retracts back to imply that the description and meaning generated were all along a 
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function of the (far more secure) intention and origin that make the work of art 
what it really ‘is’.62 
The process at work here can be seen in a recent article, ‘The Power of 
Looking: Teaching Students the Value of Deceleration and Immersive Attention’, 
based on a lecture given at the Harvard Initiative for Learning and Teaching 
conference in 2013.63 As the subtitle suggests, the author, Jennifer L. Roberts, sets 
out to illustrate the value of focused attention to works of art, of slowing down, of 
‘delay’. She approvingly quotes David Joselit’s suggestion that paintings are ‘time 
batteries, deep reservoirs of experience’, and describes the great value her 
students have found in the exercise in which she sends them to look at a single 
painting for three hours while taking notes on it. To illustrate the point, she relates 
that she carried out the exercise herself on John Singleton Copley’s Boy with a 
Squirrel (plate 5) as part of her research on a recent book, and that ‘it took me a 
long time to see some of the key details that eventually became central to my 
interpretation and my published work on the painting’. 
The unusual clarity of the account, given its origins in a didactic setting, 
allows for the abstraction of a basic recipe for putting together an interpretation 
grounded in close looking. Roberts’s interpretation proceeds from picking out 
pictorial details like the fingers spanning the water glass, to giving information 
about Copley’s having produced the painting to send to England. It then moves to 
a higher-level reading of the symbolising of, and allusion to, questions of time and 
distance the described details involve, before suggesting an overall meaning for 
the painting as being ‘about its own patient passage through time and space’. The 
four general stages, which in practice can be carried out in a different order, and 
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with different stresses, often so that one or other will only ever be implicitly dealt 
with, are: qualities; context; redescription; meaning. 
 
1) Qualities. Pick out a selection of qualities of the object that appear 
significant. 
 
1b) Purposefulness. Attribute some kind of purposefulness to them (treating 
them as the product of an agent acting, from which we can make inferences 
about that action). 
 
2) Context. Bring in, allude to, or have already implicitly established, a 
context (which can be anything from the kinds of socio-historical 
background most often associated with the word, to an abstract concept, a 
methodology, a later context of reception, or a general proposition about 
meaning in artworks of a particular type). 
 
3) Redescription. Redescribe the qualities originally picked out in terms 
relevant to the context (through metaphor, metonym, synecdoche, and 
association to other works or things). 
 
4) Meaning. Narrate the redescribed qualities to give a ‘meaning’ of the work. 
 
This works in the example of Copley’s painting as follows: 
 
1) Qualities are picked out. 
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- After nine minutes it was noticed ‘that the shape of the boy’s ear precisely 
echoes that of the ruff along the squirrel’s belly’. 
- After 21 minutes Roberts ‘registered the fact that the fingers holding the 
chain exactly span the diameter of the water glass beneath them’. 
- After 45 minutes she ‘realized that the seemingly random folds and 
wrinkles in the background curtain are actually perfect copies of the shapes 
of the boy’s ear and eye’. 
 
1b) Purposefulness is attributed to the qualities. 
- Along with the echo of boy’s ear and squirrel’s belly it was noticed that 
‘Copley was making some kind of connection between the animal and the 
human body and the sensory capacities of each’. 
- The echo of background curtain and boy’s ear and eye are ‘as if Copley had 
imagined those sensory organs distributing or imprinting themselves on the 
surface behind him’. 
(In both cases here note the artist as subject of the sentence or clause: 
‘Copley was making’; ‘as if Copley had imagined’.) 
 
2) A context is established, based on details of Copley’s slow, long-distance 
relationship with the London art world. 
- Copley was already successful in the United States but was keen to get 
feedback from the London art world. 
- He created and sent this picture to begin the correspondence. 
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- It was around eleven months before a letter was received in reply, 
informing him of the reception, and future correspondence continued at a 
similar pace. 
 
3) The qualities picked out in the initial close looking are redescribed in 
terms relevant to the context. 
- The squirrel is a flying squirrel, as the belly indicates, ‘a species native to 
North America with obvious thematic resonances for the theme of travel and 
movement’, while ‘squirrels in painting and literature were commonly 
understood to be emblems of diligence and patience’. 
- The glass of water and hand ‘evokes the passage of a sensory chain across a 
body of water and thereby presents in microcosm the plight or task of the 
painting itself’. 
- The profile format, ‘in the eighteenth century […] was very strongly 
associated with persistence in time and space.’ Profiles were usually seen on 
coins, and ‘[i]n essence, a coin is a tool for transmitting value through space 
and time in the most stable possible way. Coins are technologies for 
spanning time and distance, and Copley borrows from these associations for 
a painting that attempts to do the same thing.’ 
 
4) The redescribed qualities are brought together to support a meaning. 
- ‘The painting is about its own patient passage through time and space […] 
Copley’s painting, in other words, is an embodiment of the delays that it was 
created to endure.’ 
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This is a clear illustration of the process whereby contexts are expanded outwards 
to enrich the reading of the work – from the moment of creation of the work, to 
Copley’s artistic context, to the London art world and transatlantic dialogue, and 
the reception of Copley’s work there – which is then secured as quasi-intentional. 
(In the more complex presentations that are usual in academic art-historical 
writing, the process seen here may be carried out a number of times, as a series of 
loops are made that select qualities, explicate a context, redescribe the qualities, 
select new qualities, and so on.)64 An opening suggestion that details picked out 
were later crucial to the interpretation does briefly imply a view of ‘found’ details 
and ‘made’ interpretation, but Roberts’ text is predominantly couched in the 
language of recovery of historical meaning. While she is cautious and subtle in her 
claims, the interpretation is naturally to be taken as an historically-grounded one 
– the meanings, associations, and such like that she suggests to her audience, are 
all also meant as if for Copley in the past, such that he may well at some level have 
seen or experienced the painting as, post-interpretation, we now should. 
To some formalist or modernist critics the analysis in question might be 
rejected as a classic example of socio-historical or culturological contextual 
interpretation. Meaning, it might be claimed, is being made by drawing on a 
context brought from ‘outside’. But this would entirely miss the point that there is 
no question of secure visual analysis without some idea of a context of origin or 
reception that will decide what the work really ‘is’. In this sense we are always 
dealing with preferred forms of what might constitute a disambiguating context, 
rather than any neatly internal/external, text/context, situation. 
This can be seen in another, briefer, example, taken from a critic of exactly 
this kind of interpretation – who writes that ‘as important as these contextual 
 24 
 
analyses can be, in them the task of interpreting the meaning of the work itself 
often yields to accounting for its causes. The work of art is treated as a result of 
certain pressures, an effect of its context’s causing’.65 Dealing with Jackson Pollock, 
the art historian, Michael Schreyach, follows a similar line to Cronan in resisting 
the reduction of meaning to either causal explanations (including explicit artistic 
statements) or the affective responses of an empirical viewer. Instead his 
argument for an ‘intentionalist position’ is more or less identical to Cronan’s. He 
adds explicit nods to Wollheim and Charles Harrison, an acknowledgement of the 
‘hypothetical’ nature of his construction of intention, and a by now familiar appeal 
to the perceptual effects of the work of art as the best way to get at intention. 
Putting Schreyach’s interpretation of Pollock’s Number 1, 1949 (plate 6) into 
the schema outlined above, the first stage proceeds as usual: 
 
1) Qualities are picked out, as a set of perceptual effects are described as 
qualities possessed by the work. 
- It is difficult for a viewer to select from the surface any single pictorial 
incident that seems to impinge upon attention more than any other. 
- But with the gaze fixed at the centre, a relatively stable elliptical area 
appears, which counters the all-over quality of the surface. 
 
1b) Purposefulness is established. 
- ‘This thwarting of visual equilibrium has implications for how we interpret 
the modes of experience or consciousness Pollock wants to express.’ 
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Something more interesting happens, however, at the stage of adding context, for 
the writing moves directly from initially picked out qualities to a higher-level 
redescription of those aspects of the work. What is easily missed here is what has 
already been set up by the lengthy earlier part of the essay, as well as a footnote to 
Michael Fried’s ‘Shape as Form’ essay (one of the set of mid- to late-1960s texts 
that were foundational in the development of Fried’s ideas about modernist 
painting).66 This indicates that: 
 
2) the ‘context’ added by allusion is one of a particular view of modernist 
painting and the kind of interpretation proper to it, deriving primarily from 
Fried and to a lesser extent Walter Benn Michaels and others. It involves two 
propositions crucial to what follows. 
- One of the features of high modernist painting was its resistance to the 
literal shape of its material support, so that the painting operates as a work 
of art, rather than like any other object in the world.  
- The work of art – having successfully avoided reduction to mere object – is 
the product of an intention, and the dramatizing of its intentionality is one 
significant feature of modernist painting. 
 
3) The qualities of the work (the particular perceptual effects highlighted) 
are redescribed in accordance with the context. 
- ‘the internal framing of the ovoid provides a certain emergent structure to 
the image which restores to the painting a degree of pictorial cohesiveness 
that is more or less independent of both its perceived limits and the literal 
frame, as if the pictorial structure is now understood to be generated from 
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the inside out, from the interior of the image to its frame, rather than the 
other way around, and creates a sense of the painting as a whole.’ 
- ‘the constitution of that totality – a structure that serves as a medium for 
expressive content, versus a merely literal shape – is to be understood itself 
as emergent from the figurative depth of the field, not given beforehand’ 
- ‘The total visual field then, far from being an accumulation of marks that 
are taken as traces or indexes of [Pollock’s] movements or actions above the 
canvas, can be understood to be expressive of something like the subject’s 
emergence to the world, and of the freedom of his or her creative 
intentionality.’ 
 
4) A meaning is provided. 
- ‘On this account, Number 1, 1949 conveys something about the conditions 
of experience through which a reflective subject might grasp the significance 
of her embodied modes of intentionality – her own deep animating 
intentions.’ 
 
In both of these cases, whether description is through openly socio-historical 
interpretation or adopts an avowedly modernist and anti-contextual stance, the 
same basic structure is in operation. A small set of qualities are picked out and 
redescribed at a new level in accordance with a set of contexts, and attenuated 
intentionality is retrospectively recovered to secure the reading as an historical 
one. In the latter example the particular construction of what modernism as an 
artistic enterprise involved itself comes to function as a context.67  
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Describing Objects/Making Modernists 
Where does this all leave things? The account that I have offered is based on two 
main points: 
 
1) Intention of an attenuated kind is typically appealed to in order to 
establish what a work is, and so the way it should be seen. 
 
2) ‘Close looking’ in practice operates via ‘redescription’ – picking out 
qualities and redescribing them in terms of a context – and this tends to be 
folded back into the appeal to an attenuated form of intention. (Rather than 
standing for a disavowal of context, in this case, modernism itself can 
function as such a context.) 
 
In closing, I would like to highlight something further that is brought into focus by 
the account of close looking offered here. Applying the analysis and the two points 
above to writing on modernism adds up to a further point:  
 
3) That a governing context brought to bear, such as modernism, functions 
in art writing to attribute a generalised form of intentionality to the set of 
artists to which it is said to be relevant. 
 
It is uncontroversial to say that the greatest modernist critics have been those 
with the most convincing and passionately defended constructions of what 
‘modernism’ as a whole involves – a fact declared by the modernism-centred 
rather than work- or artist-specific nature of some of the most violent debates 
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between them: ‘A View of Modernism’; ‘Using Language to do Business as Usual’; 
‘Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art’; ‘How Modernism Works’.68 Often it has been 
pointed out, too, that this results in ‘modernism’ for these writers becoming a 
separate volitional entity with its own intentional force.69 
What is less clear, though, is the extent to which constructions of modernism 
are then mobilised as a context, and used to construct ideas of artistic 
purposefulness. This is no more than the necessary consequence of embracing the 
circularity that results from the pattern of intention-inference in play. The works 
that the understanding, committed, and true to their own response writer singles 
out are those works that compel conviction.70 In turn, the writer knows that, due 
to their ‘internal’ take on intention, what they feel is there in the work is all they 
need in order to decide what was meant by it. (‘If we have earned the right to 
question it, the object itself will answer; otherwise not’.) The works are thus said 
to compel conviction because they are intentionally made to participate in the 
(modernist) tradition of artmaking favoured by the writer: they are described as if 
the artist intended their work to engage (in whatever way the critic deems 
suitable) with those works of the recent past that also (for the writer) compelled 
conviction. Close looking will of course play its part at this stage. But everything 
significant about the work’s identity and the kind of attention that should govern 
its description has already been decided by the certainty that the artist set out to 
work in the given modernist tradition. Here is Rosalind Krauss on one of those 
artists she sees as the ‘Knights of the Medium’ providing the necessary 
continuation of modernism into the present day: ‘I think what I’m more interested 
in is stumbling on work that for one reason or another I recognise as genuine and 
then I try to understand where it comes from and what it is that secures the 
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notion of it as authentic […] I believed that the work of the Irish artist James 
Coleman is the real thing when I saw it. Outraged people weren’t saying ‘fake and 
phoney’, but the critical arguments for the work were themselves, I felt, fake and 
phoney. The defence of the work was made on grounds that I thought were 
irrelevant to the interest of the work. The grounds were national identity, the 
construction of identity, all this constructionalist stuff, which I thought had 
nothing to do with the work. What had to do with the work was the fact that he 
had essentially invented a medium. He invented a medium as the technical 
support for the work.’71 
In regard to contemporary art, this means that impressively close attention 
to works leads to Fried and Krauss defending their own narratives of the 
continuation of modernism by their own carefully picked sets of artists: the 
problematic of beholding (of absorption, theatricality, and the ‘dialectically 
transformed […] high modernist ideal of “presentness”’) in the work of Anri Sala, 
Charles Ray, Joseph Marioni, Douglas Gordon, and a range of photographers;72 or 
the reconstitution of modernism’s self-reflexive medium-based practice and its 
connected autonomy via the idea of ‘technical support’, with Ed Ruscha, William 
Kentridge, Sophie Calle, Harun Farocki, Christian Marclay, and James Coleman cast 
as ‘those very few artists who have had the courage to resist the aneurystic purge 
of the visual, a purge meant to bury the practice of specific mediums under the 
opprobrium of a mindless moralizing against the grounds of art itself’.73 
With high modernism, the closest most careful attention to those still-
canonical works yields the figure we commonsensically think of as one artist 
setting out to make aesthetic equivalents for their experiences, pursuing the logic 
of reduction to the essence of the specific medium, blinding or hypnotizing the 
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contemporary viewer, struggling with the possibility of representing oneself to 
another, and so on. Found through close looking, the individual agents-as-
modernist-artists designated under each proper name (‘Matisse’) are made to 
proliferate in step with that of modernisms, while within each individual writer’s 
modernism we find a likeness in the personhood and the work of all included 
figures, as their deep goals and the qualities of their work alike are redescribed at 
the higher level of participation in that particular narrative of modernism’s 
history.  
For this reason, Harrison’s suggestion – that the artist deserving of the name 
tests for their work’s capacity to ‘arbitrate its own description’ – gets things the 
wrong way round. In practice, art writers find works that compel conviction then 
carefully redescribe them, making their own kind of modernists out of the people 
who created them. 
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